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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1. Whether federal agents violated the Fourth Amendment right of
the appellant to be secure against unreasonable searches and
seizures when agents, pursuant to a valid premises search
warrant, searched a purse defendant had voluntarily placed on a
chair while she was a guest on the premises?
2. Whether appellant is subject to criminal liability under 18
U.S.C. § 924(c) for using or carrying a firearm during and in
relation to a drug trafficking offense when she traded twenty
kilograms of cocaine for five AK-47 assault rifles in furtherance
of a drug distribution conspiracy?
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OPINIONS BELOW
The order and judgment of the District Court for the District of
Glidden are unreported and are contained in the Transcript of the Record
(R. at 20-22; R. at 33) and in the Appendix (C-I; E-1).*
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
A formal statement of jurisdiction has been omitted in accordance
with the rule of the Northern Illinois University College of Law Second
Year Moot Court Competition.
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
The United States District Court for the District of Glidden convicted
the defendant, Elizabeth Monroe, of violating 18 U.S.C. §§ 922, 924(c) and
19 U.S.C. § 841 by possessing drugs and guns, conspiring to distribute
more than fifty grams of cocaine, and using and carrying a gun during and
in relation to a drug trafficking crime. The defendant filed this appeal
alleging that the District Court erred by denying the defense motion to
suppress all evidence obtained and derived from a search of her purse and
by improperly instructing the jury as to the scope of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).
The United States now respectfully asks this Court to affirm the conviction
of the District Court.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In 1998, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) began investigating
Krissie's Place, a restaurant owned by Kristine Downing, after the
restaurant repeatedly reported suspicious profits on its corporate Federal
Income Tax Returns. R. at 1. In January 2001 the FBI initiated
surveillance of the restaurant. R. at 1. This surveillance revealed that the
supply deliveries to the restaurant and the restaurant's patronage were
inconsistent with the restaurant's records. R. at 1. The restaurant had few
patrons and all repeat patrons were friends or acquaintances of Mrs.
Downing. R. at 1. On August 20, 2001, a credible confidential informant
tipped off the FBI that Mr. and Mrs. Downing used the restaurant to

*
The brief that was submitted for the Moot Court competition contained
appendices, which for reasons of space and simplicity are not reproduced here.
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launder money embezzled by Mr. Downing from his employer, EPRON,
Inc. R. at 2. On September 5, 2001, the FBI obtained a search warrant for
the residence of Mr. and Mrs. Downing based on probable cause that their
residence contained evidence of embezzlement and money laundering. R.
at 3. The search warrant authorized the seizure of, among other things, "all
business records, correspondence, accounts, files, banking and financial
records . . . recorded notations and other records and communications,
including hard and floppy disks." R. at 3.
Two FBI agents executed the search warrant for the Downing
apartment on September 6, 2001. R. at 4. Three persons were present in
the Downing apartment when the agents arrived: Mrs. Downing, Rachel
Carrier and the defendant Elizabeth Monroe. R. at 11. Carrier, a buyer at a
major department store, had brought purse samples to the Downing
apartment to show to the other two women. R. at 11. Approximately
fifteen purses were spread around the living room. R. at 11. When Mrs.
Downing opened the door to the agents, the defendant started to move
towards the front door carrying her purse. R. at 11. The federal agents
instructed all the women to stand in the living room while the agents
conducted their search. R. at 11. One agent searched the bedroom while
the other searched the living room and the kitchen. R. at 11.
The agents found various items specified in the search warrant,
including a computer disk that an agent discovered in a purse laying on the
bed in the bedroom. R. at 4. The agents then decided to search the other
purses in the apartment for evidence. R. at 11. The agents asked the
women to step from the living room to the dining room to facilitate their
search of the purses in the living room. R. at 11. The women moved to the
dining room, where the defendant placed her purse on a dining room chair.
R. at 12. Two other purses belonging to Carrier and Mrs. Downing were
also located in the dining room. R. at 11. The agents discovered that the
purses in the living room were empty and requested that the women move
back to the living room so they could search the dining room. R. at 12.
Shortly thereafter an agent emerged from the dining room with a 9mm
handgun in one hand and the defendant's purse in the other, stating that he
had discovered the handgun in that purse. R. at 12. After determining that
the purse belonged to the defendant, the agents requested that the defendant
produce a license for the gun, which the defendant could not produce. R. at
5. The entire search of the apartment took only forty-five minutes. R. at 5.
The FBI agents seized the 9mm handgun and later found a
resemblance between the defendant's gun and other unlicensed guns linked
to a number of gang-related crimes. R. at 6. Based on this connection, the
FBI sought and obtained a search warrant for the defendant's residence. R.
at 7. A search of the defendant's residence uncovered a list of names and

2003]

BEST RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

telephone numbers. R. at 8. The list contained the name of one Amir
Muhammad, a suspected arms dealer with the street name of "The Gypsy
King." R. at 8. At the time of the search, the defendant denied knowing
that Muhammad was an arms smuggler. R. at 8.
FBI agents interviewed Muhammad about his connection with the
defendant. R. at 8. Muhammad admitted that he had agreed to provide the
defendant with five AK-47 assault rifles in exchange for twenty kilograms
of cocaine. R. at 8. Muhammad told the agents that he and the defendant
had scheduled the exchange for September 8, 2001, at 12:00 p.m. at
Mandellia Park in Glidden. R. at 8. Muhammad then became a
cooperating government witness and agreed to carry out the planned
exchange with the defendant. R. at 8. On September 8, 2001, federal
agents observed the transaction between the defendant and Muhammad
using video and audio surveillance equipment. R. at 8. At the appointed
time and place, Muhammad and the defendant exchanged bags. R. at 8.
The bag the defendant received contained five AK-47 assault rifles. R. at
9. The agents then arrested the defendant after she audibly confirmed to
Muhammad that the bag he had already received contained cocaine. R. at
9. The FBI later verified that the defendant traded twenty kilograms of
cocaine for five assault rifles. R. at 9.
A federal grand jury indicted Elizabeth Monroe for unlawful gun
possession, conspiring to distribute fifty or more grams of cocaine, and
using and carrying a firearm in relation to a drug transaction. R. at 10.
Prior to trial, the District Court Judge entertained a defense motion to
suppress all evidence obtained from the defendant's purse on September 6,
2001, and all evidence derived from that search. R. at 13. The motion
alleged a violation of the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights. R. at 13.
The government countered this motion by asserting the search in question
occurred pursuant to a valid search warrant. R. at 17. After considering
briefs from both parties, the judge denied this motion. R. at 22.
Toward the end of the trial, the judge invited the parties to submit
proposed jury instructions to the court for its consideration. R. at 23. Both
the government and the defense tendered proposed instructions to the court
and the court received argument from both parties concerning those
proposals. R. at 24, 27. The government maintained that § 924(c)
authorized punishment for a drugs-for-guns transaction while the defense
claimed that the United States Supreme Court had circumscribed the reach
of § 924(c). R. at 24, 27. After reviewing these materials and the
applicable case law, the District Court held that § 924(c) applied to barters
of drugs for guns and instructed the jury according to the government's
proposed instructions. R. at 31. The District Court convicted Elizabeth
Monroe of unlawful possession of a gun and drugs, of conspiring to
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distribute more than fifty grams of cocaine, and of using and carrying a
gun. R. at 32. The defendant now appeals her conviction.
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Defendant's Fourth Amendment rights were not violated when agents,
executing a premises search warrant, searched a purse she had voluntarily
placed on a chair and defendant is subject to criminal liability under 18
U.S.C. § 924(c) for using or carrying a firearm in relation to a drug
trafficking offense when she traded drugs for guns in furtherance of a drug
distribution conspiracy. The United States respectfully requests that this
Court uphold the defendant's conviction and dismiss the appeal.
The District Court of Glidden properly chose to apply the physical
possession test to determine if the search of a visitor's purse under a valid
premises search warrant violated the Fourth Amendment. This choice
clearly follows from precedent in the Seventh Circuit and District of
Columbia Circuit, and more importantly from Supreme Court precedent in
Wyoming v. Houghton. In Houghton, the Supreme Court decided that
police had not violated the Fourth Amendment rights of the defendant
when they searched her purse, located in the back seat of a car they were
legally searching. This decision clearly rejected a test adopted by the
Wyoming Supreme Court that protected the defendant's purse from search
if the police knew or had reason to know that it belonged to a passenger.
The Court was concerned with the practical difficulties that such a test
would create, such as the increased litigation that would result and the ease
with which criminals could get around the rule by having passengers claim
contraband as their own. The factual similarity between Houghton and the
defendant's situation, and the fact that the Court clearly chose not to adopt
a test similar to the relationship test proposed by the defendant in this case,
indicates that the Supreme Court would choose the physical possession test
if faced with a similar case.
Additionally, the physical possession test is a bright-line test that
authorities and courts would find easy to apply in their respective
situations, and it injects a sense of predictability in its application. In
executing a search warrant police would only have to determine if an item
was in a visitor's possession. If so, they would not have authority under
the warrant to search the item. Courts, in determining whether police
exceeded the scope of the warrant, would also only have to consider the
location of the item. Under the relationship test, however, police have to
make much more difficult determinations as to who owns the particular
item and what that person's relationship is to the premises being searched.
Courts then have to determine if the search was proper based on what the
The
police knew at the time the search warrant was executed.
determinations of both the police and the courts under the relationship test
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are much more subjective and are likely to lead to inconsistent application
of the test. Finally, criminals can frustrate both the physical possession test
and the relationship test by conspiring with their guests to either pick up
contraband when the police enter the premises with a search warrant or
claim particular items as their own to avoid their search. This problem can
be limited under the physical possession test by authorizing police to search
items that they observe guests picking up as they enter the premises, if the
item could reasonably contain the items sought in the search warrant.
Even if the relationship test is applied to the facts of this case,
the
agents' search of the defendant's purse was lawful. The agents executing
the search warrant did not know who owned the purse until after they had
completed their search and found the gun. Therefore, the agents logically
assumed that the purse belonged to the occupant of the premises, making it
a possible repository for the items sought in the warrant and lawfully
subject to search. Even if the agents had notice as to the ownership of the
purse their search was still justified because sufficient exigent
circumstances existed for the agents to form an objectively reasonable basis
to believe that evidence would be removed or destroyed if they waited to
obtain another search warrant for the defendant's purse. The agents had
observed the defendant move toward the door when they arrived carrying a
purse, evidence had been located in another purse on the premises, and the
entire search had taken only forty-five minutes, which was not enough time
for agents to obtain another search warrant. Based on these facts, the
agents were justified in believing that sufficient exigent circumstances
existed to validate their search of the defendant's purse.
The District Court properly instructed the jury concerning the scope of
the "use" prong of § 924(c). The lower court's instruction conforms to the
precedents of the United States Supreme Court and six Circuit Courts of
Appeals. The Supreme Court on two separate occasions declared that
bartering a gun for drugs is a "use" of a firearm during and in relation to a
drug trafficking offense. Seven Circuit Courts of Appeals have considered
whether drugs-for-guns barters are also prohibited by § 924(c). Four
circuits hold unreservedly that drugs-for-guns barters are punishable.
Three circuits have refused to extend § 924 liability where undercover law
enforcement officers affirmatively injected guns into a drugs transaction.
However, two of these circuits hold that drugs-for-guns exchanges initiated
by defendants themselves are punishable as a "use" of a firearm. Only the
District of Columbia Circuit has stated unconditionally that § 924(c) does
not apply to drugs-for-guns transactions, and it has done so only in dicta.
Under the facts of the immediate case, where government agents merely
discovered an impending drugs-for-guns exchange, six Circuit Courts of
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Appeals hold that such an exchange is subject to the mandatory sentence
imposed by § 924(c).
The District Court's jury instruction on the "use" prong of § 924(c) is
consistent with congressional intent. Congress enacted § 924(c) to combat
the extensive dangers posed by the combination of drugs and guns and used
broad language to address those dangers. When the Supreme Court in
Bailey v. United States attempted to limit the scope of § 924(c) to exclude
possession as a "use", Congress amended § 924(c) to unambiguously
declare its purpose of imposing mandatory enhanced sentences on all
person who engage in drug trafficking with firearms. More importantly, it
is contrary to Congress' established purpose of curbing drug-related gun
violence to penalize the person giving a gun in exchange for drugs, but not
the person receiving that gun, and thus leaving untouched the person in the
position to use that gun for a violent purpose in the future. A gun creates a
grave risk of violence and death whether it is given or received in an
exchange involving illegal narcotics. The application of § 924(c) should
reflect this reality.
Notwithstanding a determination that the lower court erred in its §
924(c) jury instruction, the defendant's conviction should be affirmed. The
defendant was indicted and convicted of using and carrying a firearm
during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime. Conviction solely on the
"carry" prong of § 924(c) is sufficient to impose the mandatory five-year
sentence. It is uncontestable that the defendant had five AK-47 assault
rifles on her person at the time of her arrest. To ascertain whether the
defendant carried the rifles during and in relation to the conspiracy to
distribute cocaine, the Court must ask if those rifles facilitated or
potentially facilitated the drug offense. The five assault rifles in this case
not only facilitated the conspiracy to distribute cocaine, the drug crime in
this case would not have occurred without the weapons. The facts of this
case establish that the barter between Monroe and Muhammad persisted
after the exchange of the items since Monroe was arrested after she had
first received a bag from Muhammad and then audibly confirmed to
Muhammad that the bag she had given him contained twenty kilograms of
cocaine. Therefore, the defendant carried five firearms during and in
relation to a drug trafficking crime.
Finally, improper jury instructions are subject to constitutional
harmless error analysis. Any errors in the jury instructions regarding §
924(c) were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because a properly
instructed jury would have received a Pinkerton doctrine charge. At least
six Circuit Courts of Appeals have applied the co-conspirator liability
provided in the United States Supreme Court decision Pinkerton v. United
States to § 924(c) cases. It is uncontestable that the defendant's co-
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conspirator in this case "used" five guns by exchanging them for drugs and
"carried" five guns by bringing them to the location of the
barter.
Therefore, Ms. Monroe's co-conspirator's clearly criminal conduct is
imputable to her under the Pinkerton doctrine.
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ARGUMENT
I.

THE DISTRICT COURT'S DECISION NOT TO
SUPPRESS EVIDENCE FOUND IN MS. MONROE'S
PURSE DURING THE EXECUTION OF A VALID
BE
SHOULD
WARRANT
SEARCH
PREMISES
AFFIRMED BECAUSE THE COURT APPROPRIATELY
ADOPTED THE PHYSICAL POSSESSION TEST AND
BECAUSE THE SEARCH WAS LAWFUL EVEN IF THE
AUTHORITIES EXCEEDED THE SCOPE OF THE
SEARCH WARRANT.

The physical possession test is the proper standard for the Fourteenth
Circuit to adopt to determine whether the search of Elizabeth Monroe's
purse violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
The Fourth Amendment protects people "against unreasonable searches
and seizures." U.S. CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added). The Supreme
Court's Fourth Amendment precedent provides this protection by weighing
the degree of intrusion upon a person's privacy against the necessity for the
promotion of "legitimate governmental interests." Wyoming v. Houghton,
526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999). In doing so, the Court has indirectly supported
the physical possession test in one of its Fourth Amendment cases. See id.
The physical possession test is a bright-line standard that is easy for law
enforcement officials to apply and for judges to evaluate. Finally, a simple
exception to the standard alleviates concerns that guilty parties and their
guests can use the physical possession test to their advantage.
The lower court was correct in adopting the physical possession test
because it provides the strongest support for the Fourth Amendment goal of
protecting persons against unreasonable searches and seizures. The United
States, therefore, respectfully requests that this Court uphold the decision
of the lower court in applying the physical possession test and in not
suppressing the evidence found in the defendant's purse. The proper
standard of review to determine if the police exceeded the scope of a
warrant under the Fourth Amendment is de novo. United States v.
McLaughlin, 851 F.2d 283, 286 (9th Cir. 1988).
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Adoption of the physical possession test is proper for the
Fourteenth Circuit because it clearly follows from Supreme
Court precedent and it provides a bright-line rule that law
enforcement officials and courts can consistently follow.

The physical possession test is the appropriate standard for the
Fourteenth Circuit to adopt to determine if the police exceeded the scope of
a premises search warrant under the Fourth Amendment by searching
Elizabeth Monroe's purse. Utilization of this test achieves an effective
balance between a state's interest in enforcing criminal laws and an
individual's interest in Fourth Amendment protection.
Zachary H.
Johnson, Comment, Personal Container Searches Incident to Execution of
Search Warrants: Special Protection for Guests?, 75 Temp. L. Rev. 313,
343 (2002). By applying a minor exception, the physical possession test
rarely allows an individual who is clearly guilty of an offense to go free.
"If the courts can avoid the result of setting free some defendants who are
clearly guilty and still preserve and protect Fourth Amendment liberties as
they were intended to apply, they should do so." Id. at 342. Under the
physical possession test, criminals will not be able to hide behind the
protections afforded their guests.
1. Supreme Court precedent clearly indicates that the Court
would choose the physical possession test in a situation
involving the search of a visitor's purse pursuant to a valid
premises search warrant.
By applying the physical possession test in cases like that of Elizabeth
Monroe the Fourteenth Circuit will remain true to Supreme Court
precedent. See Houghton, 526 U.S. 295. Courts considering cases
involving the search of a visitor's belongings under a valid premises search
warrant have generally chosen one of two tests to determine if the search
was valid. The first option is the physical possession test, adopted by the
Seventh and District of Columbia Circuits, which limits the search that
authorities may conduct under a valid premises search warrant to items
which are not worn or in the possession of visitors to the premises. See
United States v. Teller, 397 F.2d 494 (7th Cir. 1968); United States v.
Johnson, 475 F.2d 977 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Those items worn by or in the
possession of visitors are "so closely associated" with that person that their
search requires a separate warrant or an exception to the warrant
requirement. United States v. Robertson, 833 F.2d 777, 784 (9th Cir.
1987). Those same items may be validly searched, however, if they are not
in the visitor's possession or have been set down, as they are "just another
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part of the premises." State v. Andrews, 549 N.W.2d 210, 214 (Wi. 1996).
The only limitation is that the container being searched must reasonably be
able to conceal the items sought in the search warrant. United States v.
Gray, 814 F.2d 49, 51 (lst Cir. 1987). The other test adopted by the First,
Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, is the relationship test, which does not look at
the item itself and its physical location, but rather considers the relationship
between the owner of the item and the premises named in the warrant.
United States v. Micheli, 487 F.2d 429 (lst Cir. 1973); United States v.
Giwa, 831 F.2d 538 (5th Cir. 1987); United States v. Young, 909 F.2d 442
(11 th Cir. 1990). Under the relationship test, the scope of the warrant does
not include one who is a "mere visitor or passerby" unless that person has a
"special relation to the place," meaning that "it could reasonably be
expected that some of his personal belongings would be there." Micheli,
487 F.2d at 432. This test requires that authorities make a determination of
who is a visitor, what their relationship is to the premises, and what belongs
to them before executing a search warrant. In deciding whether to exclude
the evidence found in Elizabeth Monroe's purse, the trial court adopted the
physical possession test, determining that the evidence was obtained legally
since the defendant did not have the purse in her possession at the time of
the search. R. at 22. The trial court was correct in adopting the physical
possession test because it conforms to Fourth Amendment Supreme Court
precedent.
In a situation similar to that at hand, the Supreme Court determined
that the search of a vehicle passenger's purse was proper under the Fourth
Amendment. In Wyoming v. Houghton, the defendant was a passenger in a
car pulled over by the police for speeding and driving with a faulty brake
light. 526 U.S. at 297. While talking to the driver, police noticed a
hypodermic syringe in his shirt pocket, which the driver admitted he used
to take drugs. Id. at 298. The driver, defendant, and another female
passenger were asked to exit the front seat of the car, at which time police
conducted a search of the vehicle. Id. Defendant's purse was found on the
back seat, and in searching it, police found drug paraphernalia and several
syringes. Id.Defendant claimed that the search violated her rights under
the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at 299. The Wyoming
Supreme Court agreed, adopting a test similar to the relationship test which
placed a passenger's container outside the scope of a search if the police
knew or had reason to know that it belonged to a passenger. Id. The
Supreme Court upheld the search of defendant's purse, concluding that "[a]
passenger's personal belongings, just like the driver's belongings or
containers attached to the car like a glove compartment, are 'in' the car,
and the officer has probable cause to search for contraband in the car." Id.
The "passenger's property" rule suggested by the Wyoming Supreme Court
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was not supported by the United States Supreme Court because it would
"dramatically reduce the ability to find and seize contraband and evidence
of crime." Id. at 305. In addition, the Court expressed concern that
passengers would claim everything as their own in order to avoid having it
searched and that a "bog of litigation" would result from whether the police
believed or should have believed the ownership claims. Id. In coming to
the conclusion that the search of Houghton's purse did not violate the
Fourth Amendment, the Court noted that these "practical realities" had to
be considered. Id. at 306. By taking practical considerations into account,
the Court in Houghton clearly indicated that they would reject any kind of
relationship test for Fourth Amendment search and seizure cases since the
same concerns would exist under that test as under the "passenger's
property" rule.
Elizabeth's Monroe's position is similar to that of the defendant in
Houghton. Both were guests in places that the authorities had probable
cause to search, neither had possession of their purses when they were
searched, and both purses were capable of concealing what the authorities
were seeking. See Houghton, 526 U.S. 295. The only difference in the two
situations was the place searched - one being a car and the other an
apartment. Based on this one factual difference, the Supreme Court's
analysis would be unlikely to change from allowing the search of a purse
found in a car to disallowing the search of a purse found in an apartment.
See id. Additionally, if the relationship test were adopted in the
defendant's situation, the practical concerns brought up by the Court in
Houghton would arise. See id. Authorities' ability to find and seize
contraband would be greatly reduced because visitors who did not have a
sufficient relationship to the premises would be able to claim items
containing contraband as their own, eliminating the ability of police to
search those items. See id. Litigation would increase based on claims that
authorities should have known that a relationship did not exist between the
owner and the premises and they should have known that a particular item
belonged to a visitor. See id. Since the Supreme Court in Houghton
refused to adopt a test similar to the relationship test and expressed
concerns that also exist with the use of the relationship test, this decision
supports a conclusion that given the chance they would adopt the physical
possession test in a search and seizure situation involving the search of a
visitor's belongings.
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The physical possession test is a straightforward, bright-line
rule for authorities to apply and with one minor exception, it
would be difficult for criminals to overcome with the help of
willing guests.

The physical possession test is the desirable test to apply from a
practical standpoint in that it would provide a bright-line rule for law
enforcement officials to follow. "Such bright line rules are desirable in the
area of criminal procedure because they provide certainty to both the police
and to people's expectation of the law." Zachary H. Johnson, Comment,
Personal Container Searches Incident to Execution of Search Warrants:
Special Protection for Guests?, 75 Temp. L. Rev. 313, 339-40 (2002). In
conducting search warrants, police under the physical possession test only
need to determine whether an object is in the physical possession of
someone for whom they did not have a search warrant. Id. at 340. Under
the relationship test, on the other hand, police executing a search warrant
must make difficult determinations as to the identities and relationships of
the persons on the premises. Id. at 339. Based on their knowledge going in
and the information provided by the individuals on the premises - which
may or may not be accurate - the police are forced to make an "on-thespot" determination as to who is a mere visitor or passerby. Id. Such
discretionary aspects of the relationship test have resulted in inconsistent
decisions by courts. Andrews, 549 N.W.2d at 217. For example, under a
search warrant that only names male occupants, the search of a woman's
purse has been found to be both within in the scope of the warrant because
police had no notice of ownership and illegal because police could not
reasonably believe the purse belonged to the man named in the warrant. Id.
The physical possession test, on the other hand, can be consistently applied
by the police and the courts because they would only be required to
consider the location of the item to be searched. See Teller, 397 F.2d 494.
A commonly expressed concern with the physical possession test is
that a visitor on the premises to be searched can easily frustrate the purpose
of a search warrant by picking up contraband when the police arrive.
Micheli, 487 F.2d at 431. As long as this individual is not named in the
search warrant, the police would not have the right to search those items
because they are in a visitor's physical possession. Extending the scope of
a search warrant to items carried would impact the "legitimate expectations
of privacy of persons ... who have chosen to protect their expectations by
carrying containers which are personal to them." Robertson, 833 F.2d at
785. This concern is not limited to the physical possession test, however,
as search warrants can also be frustrated under the relationship test.
"[V]isitors to the premises could frustrate the efforts of police by placing
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contraband among their unworn personal effects or by announcing
ownership of various articles of clothing and containers in order to place
those items beyond the scope of the warrant." Commonwealth v. Reese,
549 A.2d 909, 911 (Pa. 1988). As stated earlier, the Supreme Court in
Houghton expressed similar unease with the "passenger's property"
exception adopted by the Wyoming Supreme Court. Houghton, 526 U.S. at
305. They feared that once the exception became known, passengers
would begin to claim everything as their own in order to keep it from being
the subject of search. Id. Thus, by "fraud and gamesmanship" criminals
and their guests working together could "erect barriers to the effective and
legitimate execution of search warrants." Reese, 549 A.2d at 911.
This problem can be avoided under the physical possession test by
application of a simple exception that has already been applied by one
circuit court. In Walker v. United States the police had a valid search
warrant to search premises where it was believed heroin was being sold.
327 F.2d 597, 598 (D.C. Cir. 1963). While executing the search warrant, a
detective observed defendant Walker pass to defendant Woody a brown
purse wallet and a brown paper bag. Id. The detective promptly arrested
both defendants and searched the bag and wallet, finding narcotics. Id.
Defendants argued that the search exceeded the scope of the warrant
because the warrant authorized police to search a place, not a person. Id.at
599. The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals held that the
detective did not exceed the scope of the warrant. "To hold otherwise, on
the facts of this case, would be to suggest that a warrant to search premises
may be frustrated by the device of simply picking up the guilty object and
holding it in one's hand." Id. at 600. While the court in Walker limited the
exception to the special circumstances in that case, it could also be applied
to limit the ability of criminals and their guests to use the physical
possession test to their advantage. See id. If law enforcement authorities,
upon executing a valid search warrant, see a visitor pick up an item or
container that could possibly conceal an item sought in the search warrant,
that item or container would be exempt from the physical possession rule
and police would have the authority to search it without committing a
Fourth Amendment violation. See Walker, 327 F.2d 597. Thus, guests
would still maintain a legitimate expectation of privacy in items they
carried on them, but they would not be able to fraudulently help criminals
conceal contraband from search warrants validly based on probable cause.
This same exception would not work to correct the equivalent problem
with the relationship test, however, because guests do not have to be
holding an item in order to claim it as theirs and make it immune from
search. Any time during a search a guest could claim an item as their own,
perhaps even at the urging of the occupant of the premises while the search
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is being conducted. Without an exception limiting this possibility, "the
practical effect of the relationship test is that some individuals who are
clearly guilty of an offense will go unpunished because the evidence of
their guilt will be unavailable to the prosecution." Zachary H. Johnson,
Comment, Personal Container Searches Incident to Execution of Search
Warrants: Special Protection for Guests?, 75 Temp. L. Rev. 313, 342
(2002). This situation can be avoided, with individuals still accorded
Fourth Amendment protection, by use of the physical possession test with
the Walker exception. Guests are still afforded Fourth Amendment
protection under Ybarra v. Illinois, in which the Supreme Court determined
that probable cause to search certain premises does not extend to probable
cause to search any persons on those premises. 444 U.S. 85, 91 (1979).
This protection only extends, however, to items worn or carried on those
persons as the authorities are conducting their search. Any other personal
property not worn or carried becomes "merely another household item
subject to the lawful execution of the search warrant." Teller, 397 F.2d at
497. Under the physical possession test as soon as Elizabeth Monroe put
her purse on the chair, it was "no more part of her person than would have
been a dress which she had worn into the room and then removed for
deposit in a clothes closet." Id. Thus, federal agents did not violate the
defendant's Fourth Amendment rights because she was not carrying her
purse at the time the agents searched it.
B.

The record demonstrates that the search of Elizabeth Monroe's
purse was permissible even if it exceeded the scope of the
premises search warrant because the authorities had no notice as
to the ownership of the purse when it was searched and even if
they did, sufficient exigent circumstances existed to justify the
search.

Even if the Fourteenth Circuit chooses to adopt the relationship test to
determine if the police violated the Fourth Amendment rights of the
defendant, the search of the defendant's purse was still lawful. First,
federal agents were not aware of the ownership of the purse at the time they
searched it. Therefore, the agents did not violate the Fourth Amendment
because they had no notice that the purse belonged to anyone other than the
occupant of the premises, for which they had a valid search warrant.
Second, even if the agents were aware that the purse belonged to a visitor,
sufficient exigent circumstances existed to make the search of the
defendant's purse permissible even without a warrant.
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Without notice that a particular item belongs to a visitor on
the premises, the search of that item under a valid premises
search warrant does not violate the Fourth Amendment.

Under the relationship test authorities with a valid premises search
warrant cannot search items that belong to guests unless they have a special
relation to the premises. Micheli, 487 F.2d at 432. The Fourth
Amendment is not violated, however, if authorities have no notice that a
particular item belongs to a guest. See Andrews, 549 N.W.2d at 214.
"[P]olice lacking notice that property belongs to a visitor may assume that
all property on the premises is owned by the occupant and, therefore, is
searchable." Id. In State v. Nabarro police executed a search warrant of a
hotel room based on reliable information that the two men occupying the
room possessed drugs. 525 P.2d 573, 574 (Haw. 1974). When police
entered the room, Nabarro was one of three women in the room with the
men. Id.. Her purse was nearby, but it was not in her possession when the
police arrived. Id. A little while later Nabarro picked up her purse and
walked toward the bathroom, at which time police told her to surrender her
purse. Id. Police searched it and found contraband inside. Id. The
Supreme Court of Hawaii determined that the search of Nabarro's purse
was unreasonable because the police had notice, based on the fact that the
warrant named two men, that the purse belonged to someone that was a
visitor to the premises. Id. at 577.
FBI agents lacked similar notice when they searched the defendant's
purse. First, there were over fifteen purses located throughout the
apartment, and agents conducting the search had no way of knowing who
owned each of those purses. R. at 11. Without this knowledge they had
the right under the search warrant to search all of those purses under the
assumption that "all objects within premises lawfully subject to search
under a warrant are part of those premises for the purposes of executing the
warrant." Nabarro, 525 P.2d at 577. If not, then "the effective execution of
a warrant to search a place would be impossible since the police could
never be sure that a plausible repository for items named in the warrant
belongs to a resident, and hence is searchable, or to a non-resident, and
hence is not searchable." Id. Second, one of the agents who conducted the
search gave a sworn statement that the purse and the gun found in it were
not identified as belonging to the defendant until after the purse had been
searched and the gun had been located. R. at 5. Thus, the search of the
defendant's purse was valid under the search warrant because agents did
not have notice of the ownership of the purse until after they had conducted
their search.
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Even if the authorities had notice that the purse belonged to
a visitor, they had an objectively reasonable belief that
exigent circumstances existed that justified a warrantless
search of the defendant's purse.

Even under the relationship test, the lower court's refusal to suppress
the evidence obtained from Elizabeth Monroe's purse is still supported by
exigent circumstances. Exigent circumstances are one exception to the rule
that warrantless searches are per se unreasonable. United States v.
Tartaglia, 864 F.2d 837, 840 (D.C. Cir. 1989). Police are justified in
conducting a search and seizure without a warrant "[w]hen probable cause
has been established and there is danger that evidence will be removed or
destroyed before a warrant can be obtained." Id. In relying on this
exception, police must have *an "objectively reasonable basis" for
determining that immediate action is necessary. Young, 909 F.2d at 446.
'[T]he appropriate inquiry is whether the facts, as they appeared at the
moment of entry, would lead a reasonable, experienced agent to believe
that evidence might be destroyed before a warrant could be secured."
United States v. Rivera, 825 F.2d 152, 156 (7th Cir. 1987).
In this case, exigent circumstances warranted the search of Elizabeth
Monroe's purse. First, when agent's arrived at the apartment, they
observed the defendant moving toward the front door with her purse in
hand, but not her jacket. R. at 11. This action may reasonably have led
agents to believe that the defendant was hiding evidence on her person or in
her purse, and that she was trying to leave in order to 'dispose of it. See
Young, 909 F.2d at 446. Second, the agents' search of the apartment lasted
only forty-five minutes, which would not have given them enough time to
secure a second warrant for the defendant's purse. R. at 5. Finally, agents
had already found evidence of the sort sought in the search warrant in
another purse in the apartment, so they had every reason to believe that
other purses could contain similar evidence. R. at 4. Based on this
information, agents could have reasonably believed that the defendant's
purse contained vital evidence that could have been destroyed or removed
before they were able to obtain another warrant. Thus, the search of the
defendant's purse was valid under the exigent circumstances exception.
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II. MS. MONROE'S CONVICTION UNDER 18 U.S.C. § 924(C) FOR
EXCHANGING TWENTY KILOGRAMS OF COCAINE FOR FIVE
AK-47 ASSAULT RIFLES SHOULD BE AFFIRMED BECAUSE
THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY INSTRUCTED THE JURY
THAT BARTERING DRUGS FOR GUNS IS A PROHIBITED
"USE" UNDER 924(C), MS. MONROE WAS ALSO CONVICTED
FOR "CARRYING" FIREARMS UNDER § 924(C), AND ANY
ERROREOUS JURY INSTRUCTION WAS HARMLESS.
Drug related murders in 1989 accounted for the majority of murders in
a number of major American metropolitan areas. Smith v. United States,
508 U.S. 223, 240 (1993). Aware of this fact, Congress enacted the current
version of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) primarily to combat the dangerous
combination of drugs and guns. Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S.
125, 132 (1998). The statute provides that "any person who, during and in
relation to any ...

drug trafficking crime ...

uses or carries a firearm...

shall, in addition to the punishment provided for such [crime] be sentenced
to a term of imprisonment of not less than 5 years." 18 U.S.C.S. § 924(c)
(Lexis 1996 & Supp. 2002). This enhanced penalty is designed to persuade
a person tempted to commit a drug trafficking crime to leave their gun at
home. Muscarello, 524 U.S. at 132. The United States asks this Court to
further Congress' goal of deterring potential federal felons from using or
carrying guns by applying the provisions of § 924(c) against Elizabeth
Monroe.
On September 7, 2001, FBI agents executed a search of Monroe's
residence pursuant to a search warrant. R. at 8. During the search based on
probable cause that Monroe possessed illegal firearms, federal agents
discovered a list of contact information that contained the name and
telephone number of one Amir Muhammad, a suspected illegal arms
smuggler. R. at 7-8. When the FBI agents interviewed Muhammad, the
arms smuggler confessed that he had agreed to provide Monroe with five
AK-47 assault rifles on September 8, 2001, in exchange for twenty
kilograms of cocaine. R. at 8. Muhammad agreed to cooperate with the
FBI and carried out the exchange with Monroe as planned on September 8.
R. at 8. At the appointed time and place, federal agents observed Mr.
Muhammad and Ms. Monroe exchange bags with one another. R. at 8.
Federal agents then apprehended Monroe after she audibly confirmed to
Muhammad that the bag she had given to him contained cocaine. R. at 9.
Monroe's conduct is subject to the penalties provided in § 924(c)(1) and
the District Court properly instructed the jury as to the application of this
statute. E.., United States v. Cannon, 88 F.3d 1495, 1508 (8th Cir. 1996).
The United States therefore respectfully requests that this Court affirm
Elizabeth Monroe's conviction for using and carrying a firearm in violation
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of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1). The standard of review for pure questions of law
is de novo. Elder v. Holloway, 510 U.S. 510, 516 (1994).
A.

The District Court properly instructed the jury as to the
government's burden against Ms. Monroe under the "use" prong of
18 U.S.C. § 924(c) because the United States Supreme Court
recognizes bartering as a use of a firearm and the majority of
Circuit Courts of Appeals to consider the issue hold that bartering
liability under § 924(c) applies to both guns-for-drugs and drugsfor-guns exchanges, and any possible error was harmless.

Congress enacted § 924(c) to combat the violence associated with
drug trafficking. Muscarello, 524 U.S. at 132. The mandatory enhanced
sentences provided under § 924(c) serve as an incentive to deter potential
felons from using guns in connection with their illegal conduct.
Muscarello, 524 U.S. at 132.
However, determining what exactly
constitutes a use of a firearm in relation to a drug trafficking offense caused
perplexity in the federal courts. Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 142
(1995). The United States Supreme Court interpreted the scope of "use"
under § 924(c) on two separate occasions to resolve this perplexity. Smith,
508 U.S at 225; Bailey, 516 U.S. at 138. On both occasions, the Court
established that bartering a gun in exchange for drugs constitutes a "use" of
a firearm in relation to a drug trafficking crime punishable under § 924(c).
Smith, 508 U.S. at 237; Bailey, 516 U.S. at 148. Arguably, these
pronouncements by the Supreme Court do not settle the question of
whether a barter of drugs for a gun also constitutes a use of a firearm under
§ 924(c). See United States v. Westmoreland, 122 F.3d 431, 435 (7th Cir.
1997). Although the Circuit Courts of Appeals have split over the meaning
of "use" in the past, the vast majority of the circuits that have applied §
924(c) to facts similar to the immediate case have concluded that drugs-forguns exchanges are uses punishable under this statute.
1. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)'s prohibition on using a firearm includes
bartering drugs-for-guns because the United States Supreme
Court held that barters of guns-for-drugs constitutes an "active
employment" of a firearm and six Circuit Courts of Appeals
have held that drugs-for-guns exchanges also are an "active
employment" of a firearm where government agents do not
initiate the exchange.
The United States Supreme Court decisions in Smith and Bailey
clearly establish that an individual bartering a gun for drugs uses that gun
in relation to a drug trafficking offense and is subject to the enhanced
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sentencing provided under § 924(c). Smith, 508 U.S at 225; Bailey, 516
U.S. at 138. In Smith, the Court considered the situation where a defendant
offered to trade an automatic firearm for two ounces of cocaine. Smith,
508 U.S. at 226. The Court construed the word "use" according to its
ordinary and natural meaning. Id. at 228. As part of this analysis, the
Court viewed § 924(c) in context by comparing its provisions with § 924(d)
where Congress employed the word "use" to criminalize other conduct
involving firearms. Id. at 234. In § 924(d), Congress listed offenses where
firearms were used both as weapons and items of commerce. Id. The
Court concluded, "[tihe fact that a gun is treated momentarily as an item of
commerce does not render it inert or deprive it of its destructive capacity,"
and held the bartering of a gun for illegal narcotics punishable under §
924(c). Id. at 240.
The Court's decision in Bailey did not alter Smith's holding that
bartering is a use of a firearm. Bailey, 516 U.S. at 148. Bailey presented
the issue of whether a defendant's storage of a firearm with illegal
narcotics satisfied the use prong of § 924(c). Id. at 139-40. In this context,
the Court restricted the meaning of "use" in § 924(c) by requiring a finding
that the defendant "actively employed" a firearm. Id. at 143. To meet this
standard, the government must show more than possession of a firearm
during the commission of the drug offense. Id. The government must
establish that a firearm served as an operative factor in relation to the
The Court offered as examples of active
predicate offense. Id.
employment brandishing, displaying, bartering, striking with, firing, or
attempting to fire a firearm. Id. at 148. Thus, under both Smith and
Bailey, a defendant is subject to § 924(c) if he or she barters a gun for
drugs.
Ms. Monroe's barter of twenty kilograms of cocaine for five AK-47
assault rifles without inspiration from government agents is
indistinguishable from Smith and Bailey. See United States v. Warwick,
167 F.3d 965, 976 (6th Cir. 1999). Four of the seven Circuit Courts of
Appeals to consider the question have held unconditionally that the
distinction between a guns-for-drugs and drugs-for-guns is irrelevant to
assessing criminal liability under § 924(c). United States v. Sumler, 294
F.3d 579, 580 (3rd Cir. 2002); United States v. Ulloa, 94 F.3d 949, 956 (5th
Cir. 1996); Cannon, 88 F.3d at 1509; United States v. Ramirez-Rangel, 103
F.3d 1501, 1506 (9th Cir. 1997). The three circuits that have expressed
reservations about extending § 924(c) liability to drugs-for-guns barters
addressed cases where government agents introduced guns into drug deals.
The Sixth, Seventh, and District of Columbia Circuit Courts of
Appeals refused to hold a drugs-for-guns exchange punishable as a "use" of
a firearm where government agents posing as drug traffickers directly
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initiated exchanges involving firearms. Warwick, 167 F.3d at 976; see
Westmoreland, 122 F.3d at 435; Woodruff v. United States, 131 F.3d 1238,
1243 (7th Cir. 1997); United States v. Stewart, 246 F.3d 728, 732 (D.C.
Cir. 2001). Both the Sixth and Seventh Circuits suggested in their
respective opinions that the absence of government agents actively devising
plans for drugs-for-guns barters would change the outcome of their
decisions. Warwick, 167 F.3d at 976; Westmoreland, 122 F.3d at 436 n.1.
The Sixth Circuit in Warwick cited with approval the Fifth and Eighth
Circuit decisions extending § 924(c) to cover drugs-for-guns barters where
government agents did not inject firearms into those transactions.
Warwick, 167 F.3d at 976. The Seventh Circuit in Woodruff, a case
decided only four months after Westmoreland, extended § 924(c) to cover a
drugs-for-guns transaction which government authorities played no role in
planning. Woodruff, 131 F.3d at 1243. Only the District of Columbia
Circuit decision in Stewart, which relied heavily on Warwick and
Westmoreland, categorically rejected extending § 924(c) to drugs-for-guns
transactions. Stewart, 246 F.3d at 733. However, Stewart addressed a
drug-for-guns exchange where law enforcement officers injected guns into
a drugs transaction, making the D.C. Circuit's categorical rejection of §
924(c) liability for drugs-for-guns barters dicta and not the holding of that
case. Id.
The split in the Circuit Courts of Appeals concerning the applicability
of § 924(c) to drugs-for-guns barters is illusory under the facts of the
immediate case. See Sumler, 294 F.3d at 583. The "split" among the
circuits disappears when a drug-for-guns transaction involves no
government inducement. See Warwick, 167 F.3d at 976. The FBI played
absolutely no role in the creation of the agreement between Ms. Monroe
and Mr. Muhammad. R. at 8. The agents in this case merely uncovered a
pre-existing conspiracy between Monroe and Muhammad to exchange
twenty kilograms of cocaine for five assault rifles and enlisted the
cooperation of a bona fide conspirator to aid in the arrest of a drug
trafficker. Id. Unlike the cases in the Sixth, Seventh, and District of
Columbia Circuit, the defendant in this case planned a drugs-for-guns
barter without any government influence. See R. at 8.
An interpretation excluding drugs-for-guns barters from § 924(c)
liability undermines Congress' purpose to encourage drug dealers to leave
their guns at home since the person who surrenders a gun to receive drugs
is penalized but not the person who acquires a gun for later use. See
Muscarello, 524 U.S. at 132. Congress unambiguously expressed its intent
that § 924(c) be applied broadly when it amended that provision to punish
possession of a firearm during a drug offense in direct response to the
Bailey Court's attempt to limit the scope of § 924(c)'s "use" prong. United
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States v. Lomax, 293 F.3d 701, 703 (4th Cir. 2002). Congress did not
intend courts and juries applying § 924(c) to draw a fine metaphysical
distinction between guns-for-drugs and drugs-for-guns transactions. See
Smith, 508 U.S. at 240. A firearm creates a grave risk of violence and
death whether it is given or received in an exchange involving illegal
narcotics. See id.
2. An improper jury instruction concerning the "use" of a firearm
in this case is harmless error because a comprehensive jury
instruction would have included a charge for co-conspirator
liability and the jury found all the factors necessary to impute
to Ms. Monroe her co-conspirator's barter of five AK-47
assault rifles for twenty kilograms of cocaine which is
indisputably punishable under § 924(c).
Ms. Monroe is liable for under § 924(c) for using a firearm
notwithstanding a determination that the District Court erroneously
instructed the jury by stating that a drugs-for-guns exchange constituted a
"use" of a firearm. A jury charge that improperly instructs the jury as to an
element of an offense is subject to constitutional harmless error analysis.
Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 10 (1999). A conviction survives this
analysis if it appears "beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained
of did not contribute to the verdict obtained." Id. at 15.
No reasonable doubt exists that the jury would have convicted Ms.
Monroe even without the alleged improper jury instruction. Assuming that
a drugs-for-guns barter is not within the scope of § 924(c), a properly
charged jury would still have convicted Ms. Monroe for using the five AK47 assault rifles in relation to a drug trafficking crime. See Woodruff, 131
"F.3d at 1243. The plain language of § 924(c) permits a defendant to be
held liable for a co-conspirator's use of a firearm under the Pinkerton
doctrine. See United States v. Diaz, 864 F.2d 544, 547-48 (7th Cir. 1988).
Pinkerton v. United States establishes that a party to a continuing
conspiracy is liable for a substantive offense committed by a co-conspirator
in furtherance of a conspiracy even though the party does not participate in
the substantive offense or have any knowledge of it. 328 U.S. 640, 647
(1946). The Pinkerton doctrine requires only that the substantive offense
be a reasonably foreseeable necessity or a natural consequence of the
conspiracy. Diaz, 864 F.2d at 549. At least six Circuit Courts of Appeals,
including the Sixth, Seventh, and District of Columbia Circuits, have
applied Pinkerton to § 924(c). United States v. Masotto, 73 F.3d 1233,
1240 (2nd Cir. 1996) (listing the Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh
Circuits as having adopted the Pinkerton doctrine for § 924(c) cases);
United States v. Floyd, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 1304 (6th Cir. 1994) (listing

2003]

BEST RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

the Sixth Circuit as a circuit that has adopted Pinkerton doctrine for §
924(c) cases); United States v. Washington, 106 F.3d 983, 1011 (D.C. Cir.
1997).
Although the District Court did not specifically instruct the jury
concerning the Pinkerton doctrine, the Court's broad instruction for §
924(c) coupled with the evidence presented at trial could have allowed the
jury to find all the factors necessary to convict Ms. Monroe for coconspirator liability. See Carella v. California, 491 U.S. 263, 271 (1989)
(Scalia, J., concurring). The jury convicted Ms. Monroe of conspiring to
distribute twenty kilograms of cocaine. R. 32. To convict on this charge,
the jury had to find that Monroe and Mr. Muhammad agreed to an
exchange of the twenty kilograms of cocaine and the five AK-47s, and that
the exchange of these items was in furtherance of the drug distribution
conspiracy. See Paul Silvio Berra, Jr., Comment, Co-Conspirator Liability
Under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c): is it Possible to Escape?, 1996 Wis. L. Rev. 603,
604 n.5 (1996). Ms. Monroe's co-conspirator in furthering the conspiracy
exchanged guns for drugs, a use of a gun specifically proscribed by §
924(c).
Smith, 508 U.S. at 225.
Under the Pinkerton doctrine,
Muhammad's use of a gun in furtherance of a drug distribution conspiracy
is imputable to Monroe. See Woodruff, 131 F.3d at 1243. Thus, a jury
thoroughly instructed on the full scope of § 924(c) would still have
convicted Ms. Monroe even without an instruction allowing a conviction
for a drugs-for-guns barter. See id.
B. Should the Court decide that a drugs-for-guns exchange does not
qualify as "using" a firearm during and in relation to a drug
trafficking crime under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), Ms. Monroe is still
liable for "carrying" a firearm because Ms. Monroe had five AK47 assault rifles on her person immediately after she exchanged
twenty kilograms of cocaine for the guns and a majority of the
Circuit Courts of Appeals have extended co-conspirator liability to
§ 924(c).
A reversal of Ms. Monroe's conviction for using five assault rifles
does not in itself overturn her conviction under § 924(c). Bailey, 516 U.S.
at 150. The jury also convicted Ms. Monroe for carrying five firearms in
relation to a conspiracy to distribute twenty kilograms of cocaine. R. at 32.
The United States Supreme Court has interpreted the carry prong of §
924(c) broadly to effectuate that statute's objective of combating the
dangerous combination of drugs and guns. Muscarello, 524 U.S. at 133,
136. The scope of the carry prong is restricted primarily by the
requirement that a firearm be carried during and in relation to a drug
trafficking crime. Id. at 137. The Court indicated that the phrase "during
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and in relation to" is expansive. See Smith, 508 U.S. at 237. Congress'
purpose requires that the breadth of the carry prong encompass a situation
where an individual carries firearms on their person at the instant an
exchange of drugs for guns occurs. See id. at 240.
1. Ms. Monroe is also liable under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) for carrying
five firearms because she carried five firearms on her person
throughout the bartering event and the carrying is so related to
the exchange as to be considered during and in relation to a
drug trafficking crime.
Congress did not intend the federal courts to draw fine metaphysical
distinctions for when guns and drugs are part of a federal criminal offense.
Id. The primary restriction on the scope of § 924(c) is the requirement that
a firearm be carried "during and in relation to" a drug trafficking crime.
Muscarello, 524 U.S. at 139. To meet this requirement, a firearm "must
have some purpose or effect with respect to the drug trafficking crime; its
presence or involvement cannot be the result of accident or coincidence."
Smith, 508 U.S. at 238. The firearm must facilitate or potentially facilitate
the drug trafficking offense. Id. This restriction is meant to prevent
prosecutions where guns played no part in the crime, not to discourage
prosecutors from furthering Congress' goal of getting drug traffickers to
leave their guns at home. Muscarello, 524 U.S. at 137.
Ms. Monroe's receipt of five AK-47s meets the requirements of
carrying a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking offense under
§ 924(c). The firearms in this case not only facilitated the drug trafficking
crime, the offense in this case would not have occurred without the
firearms. R. at 8. The only factor that could undermine a finding that Ms.
Monroe did carry a firearm during a drug crime is if the drug crime had
terminated by the time that Ms. Monroe had the guns on her person. See
United States v. Layne, 192 F.3d 556, 571 (6th Cir. 1999). However, the
facts of this case clearly establish that the barter between Monroe and
Muhammad continued after Monroe had the guns on her person. See R. at
8-9. The arresting agents observed Muhammad and Monroe exchange bags
and arrested Monroe only after she audibly confirmed to Muhammad that
the bag she had given to him contained twenty kilograms of cocaine. R. at
8-9. Further, a restrictive timeframe for the "during and in relation to"
requirement is contrary to Supreme Court precedent and undermines
Congress' intent to combat the combination of guns and drugs. Smith, 508
U.S. at 237. If the criminal event is terminated the instant the barter
occurs, then one party is punished for bringing a gun to exchange for drugs,
but the party accepting the gun and in the position to employ its destructive
capacity at a later date is not penalized. See Layne, 192 F.3d at 571.
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2. Ms. Monroe is liable under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) for carrying five
firearms because her co-conspirator carried those weapons in
furtherance of the cocaine distribution conspiracy, thus making
the co-conspirator's actions imputable to Ms. Monroe.
Ms. Monroe is liable under § 924(c) for carrying a firearm
notwithstanding a determination that the District Court erroneously
instructed the jury by stating that a drugs-for-guns exchange 'constituted
carrying of a firearm. A jury charge that improperly instructs the jury as to
an element of the offense is subject to constitutional harmless error
analysis. Neder, 527 U.S. at 10. A conviction survives this analysis if it
appears "beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not
contribute to the verdict obtained." Id. at 15.
No reasonable doubt exists that the jury would have convicted Ms.
Monroe for carrying a firearm in violation of § 924(c) even without the
alleged improper jury instruction. As similarly stated above, if the jury
instructions included a charge concerning the Pinkerton doctrine, sufficient
facts were presented at trial to establish that Ms. Monroe's co-conspirator
carried a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking offense, thus
making that offense imputable to Ms. Monroe. See Pinkerton, 328 U.S. at
647; Carella, 491 U.S. at 271 (Scalia, J., concurring).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the decisions of the United States District
Court for the District of Glidden denying the defense motion for
suppression of evidence and adopting the government's jury instructions as
to 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) should be affirmed.
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